Globalizing Capital: A History of the. International Monetary A major theme of Barry Eichengreen’s accessible history of the internationa etary system since. Eichengreen, B.: Globalizing Capital: a. System. IX, pp. Princeton Univer. US $ Barry Eichengreen at his best: his lat international monetary system. “Eichengreen’s purpose is to provide a brief history of the international monetary system. In this, he succeeds magnificently. Globalizing Capital will become a.
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Eichengreen notes the association of exchange-rate behavior in each monetary regime with contemporaneous developments in world capital markets.
Features of the gold standard era were the high level of international capital mobility and the freedom from controls of international financial transactions. The introduction of capital controls and a drastic decline in capital flows after marked the interwar period.
The Bretton Woods era began with officially sanctioned capital controls. When the era ended, the controls had been richengreen by the emergence of liquid international financial markets.
Gobalizing the s, there has been further growth of highly mobile capital flows and a deepening of international capital markets. Eichengreen rejects the proposition that the demise of the pegged-exchange-rate Bretton Woods system and the subsequent shift to fluctuating exchange rates are wholly attributable to the resurgence of capital mobility.
Fixed exchange rates and unfettered capital mobility, after all, characterized the gold-standard regime. Authorities therefore could face down a challenge from the masses, when defense of the convertibility of domestic currencies into the weight of gold specified by the fixed exchange rate required raising interest rates and contracting economic globalizinh.
Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System by Barry Eichengreen
Eichemgreen the pre gold standard, governments of the industrialized countries were committed to preserving external stability even at the cost of internal stability. Since World War I, however, universal suffrage and the rise of a politically robust labor movement have constrained the ability of government authorities globaluzing elevate external over internal stability.
The imposition of controls on capital mobility afforded them some leeway to pursue internal objectives without sacrificing the external objective.
Unimpeded inflows of capital can lead to inflation and outflows to recession. Capital controls freed the authorities from these unwanted consequences, but because controls are never watertight, and eventually became unenforceable, they were no answer to the weakened commitment in modern societies to pegged exchange rates.
His is a political economy view, but I believe the argument also holds true on economic grounds. When the public-sector share of national income is one-tenth, the burden of economic contraction that in some circumstances is required under the gold standard can be spread across a private sector accounting for 90 percent of national income.
Other themes of the work are less compelling. Throughout, Eichengreen stresses the crucial role of international globalozing in preserving monetary regimes. Similar comments in the book are that if other countries during the interwar period had supported the exchange rate of the nation in distress, economic conditions would not have deteriorated so badly p.
Declaiming the benign consequences of international cooperation is sentimentality. Eichengreen recognizes that at the domestic level, no policy consensus may exist. How much more so, it follows, will lack of consensus exist at the international level. A monetary regime that requires international cooperation for it to be viable will not survive. The design of a regime must ensure that economic relations among nations promote their self-interests.
Eichengreen believes that during the Great Depression deflation could not be avoided, because had central banks attempted to inject liquidity into financial markets to bail out banks in distress they might have violated the statutes requiring them to hold a minimum ratio of gold to their liabilities p.
This view finds no support in the case of the Federal Reserve system.
Would a hypothetical expansionary globaliziing policy in to have driven the United States off gold? The answer is no, according to the historical record. Even after these gold losses, however, the gold-reserve ratio against Federal Reserve notes and deposits was still at least 50 percent above the legally required minimum.
In addition, by the spring of foreign claims against U. Just as gold losses in to did not force the United States to devalue, had they occurred in to in response to a hypothetical monetary expansion, they also would not capjtal done so. In Augustat the start of the Great Depression, the U. By Januarythanks to gold inflows after Augustthe stock exceeded its initial level. Thereafter, demand for gold coin and certificates soared, reflecting domestic fear of devaluation and speculative purchases globalizingg sterling, as the incoming Roosevelt administration raised doubts about its commitment to the existing eichdngreen parity.
Eichengreen and those who share his views hold that expansionary Federal Reserve action was precluded for another reason. Because banks had little encouragement to borrow from the Reserve banks, there was a shortage of eligible bills. The problem, even if this were a true constraint on monetary expansion which there is reason to doubtwas eliminated by the Glass-Steagall Act of 27 Februarywhich permitted government bonds in Federal Reserve portfolios to serve as collateral against the note issue.
In any event, if the condition existed, it did so only during the five months from October through February Not only the U. Despite my reservations about some of the positions Eichengreen takes on historical and current monetary regimes, he has performed a useful service by providing a succinct characterization of the varieties of international monetary regimes that countries have adopted in recent decades in response to the rise of capital mobility.
Forces undermining capital controls overwhelmed efforts of governments to manage their currencies.
Barry Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital
The book traces the evolution of preferences for different kinds of exchange-rate arrangements by countries against the background of swings in the behavior of their exchange rates. For the United States and Japan the shift toward flexible exchange rates since appears sustainable, and it will likely lead smaller countries in the Western Hemisphere and Asia to tie their currencies to that of their larger neighbor.
In Western Europe, after the failure of the European Snake of the s and the disappointments of the European Monetary System of the s and early s, the countries of the European Union are engaged in an effort to form a monetary union centered on Germany, with what success the next few years will reveal. LDCs have tried to reduce high inflation rates by unilaterally pegging the nominal exchange rate as a nominal anchor in a stabilization program.
Some small open economies have tried a currency-board arrangement as an alternative. As Eichengreen concludes, to understand the present diversified international monetary system, one needs to appreciate its history.
Princeton University Press, Pages: The study traces the changing face of international monetary regimes: SchwartzNational Bureau of Economic Research.